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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-2332
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AMIN A. RASHID, AKA Larry Doby Wilson, AKA
Jonothan F. Stone, III, AKA Alfred Monger, AKA Otello
Karpo, AKA Christine Harriell, AKA Ortello Karpo
        Amin A. Rashid; Amir A. Rashid; Anwar A. Rashid,
 Appellants
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 93-cr-00264)
District Judge:  Honorable Jan E. Dubois
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 24, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES AND WEIS, Circuit Judges
                                             Opinion filed: March 31, 2010                                                   
  
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
       Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), a defendant convicted of money laundering must1
“forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or
any property traceable to such property.”  Based on the evidence adduced, the jury
determined that Rashid should forfeit the home because it had been purchased with
proceeds of the fraud.
2
Appellant Amin Rashid was found guilty following a jury trial of 55 counts
of mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering, and one count of criminal forfeiture in
connection with a scheme to defraud commercial loan applicants.  In May of 1994,
Rashid was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 168 months and three years of
supervised release, a $15,000 fine, a $2,700 special assessment, and he was ordered to
pay restitution in the amount of $1,696,470, an obligation that has since been discharged
in bankruptcy.  Also in May of 1994, the federal trial judge ordered the residential
property located at 444 East Mount Pleasant Avenue forfeited pursuant to a special
verdict returned by the jury.   We affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence on1
August 4, 1995 in United States v. Rashid, C.A. No. 93-2241.  Following his
unsuccessful direct appeal, Rashid filed numerous unsuccessful challenges to his
conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, and other statutes and rules.  
As part of the criminal forfeiture order, the district judge required the
United States to publish notice of the forfeiture so third parties could claim any possible
interest in the property before the United States sold it.  On June 23, 1994, proceeding pro
se as trustee for her minor children, Joyce Rashid filed a petition for declaration of
3innocent owner status and remission of forfeited property.  The district judge denied the
petition, and we affirmed on appeal.  We concluded that neither Mrs. Rashid nor the
children could invoke the “innocent owner” defense to defeat the government’s interest in
the forfeited property, because the defense is not available in the criminal forfeiture
context.  We also concluded that Mrs. Rashid and the children could not prevail under 21
U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) or (B).  These provisions authorize a court to amend an order of
criminal forfeiture if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
she has a vested or superior interest in the property at issue at the time of the criminal acts
giving rise to the forfeiture, or that she is a bona fide purchaser for value.  Mrs. Rashid
and her children were not bona fide purchasers for value and they could not demonstrate a
vested or superior interest in the property at the time of Rashid’s criminal acts, which
began in September of 1989.  The property was not purchased until July of 1991, and,
thus, even if we accepted that she and her children acquired an interest in the property by
virtue of the trust document, they did not acquire their interest until after commission of
the criminal acts.  See United States v. Rashid, C.A. No. 94-1806 (3d Cir. August 15,
1995).
Thereafter, there was a renewed effort by Mrs. Rashid to challenge the
forfeiture.  She filed for bankruptcy, and in that proceeding filed a motion to void the
forfeiture.  The federal district judge assigned to that matter affirmed the bankruptcy
court’s order and held that the issues were fully and fairly litigated by Mrs. Rashid in the
4underlying criminal forfeiture proceedings.  See Rashid v. United States, 1996 WL
421855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 1996).  On May 19, 1997, Judgment and Final Order of
forfeiture was entered on the docket.  The property was sold.
Rashid was released from prison and began serving his term of supervised
release on September 2, 2005.  See Docket Entry No. 460.  On August 21, 2008, and
while he was still serving his term of supervised release, a federal grand jury returned an
indictment charging Rashid with two counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1341, and one count of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.  See
United States v. Rashid, D.C. Crim. No. 08-cr-00493.  A warrant for his arrest was issued
on the new charges, and the Probation Office petitioned to revoke Rashid’s 1994 term of
supervised release for violating the conditions of supervised release.  See Docket Entry
No. 460.  Rashid is currently incarcerated in pretrial detention.  Meanwhile, in October of
2008, Rashid’s 1993 criminal case was reassigned to a different United States District
Judge following the resignation from the federal bench of the original trial judge.  
At issue in the instant appeal, on January 20, 2009, in Docket Entry No.
476, Rashid filed a “Pro Se Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Rule 60(b)(6)
Motion Due to Fraud on the Court.”  In Docket Entry No. 477, Rashid, on behalf of his
sons Amir and Anwar, who are now adults, filed a “Pro Se Motion for Permission to
Intervene Pursuant to Rule 24(a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”  It was accompanied
by Docket Entry No. 478, a “Pro Se Motion to Void Ab Initio Criminal Forfeiture of 444
5East Mount Pleasant Ave.”  These two motions sought reconsideration of the criminal
forfeiture order.  In an order entered on March 19, 2009, the District Court denied all
three motions.  Rashid filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motions to intervene
and to void the criminal forfeiture, Docket Entry No. 487.  The District Court denied this
motion in an order entered on April 7, 2009.  Rashid appeals the denial of these four
motions.
We will affirm.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over final
orders of the District Court.  The District Court properly denied Rashid’s January 20,
2009 motion for reconsideration of the July 22, 1999 denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion
as time-barred.  See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(e) (effective through November 30, 2009)
(providing for motion to filed with 10 days after entry of order from which
reconsideration is sought).  The motion was, as the government has observed, “absurdly
tardy.”  See Appellee’s Brief, at 19.  
Rashid contends in his brief that the time for filing the motion for
reconsideration did not begin to run in July of 1999 because a separate judgment was not
entered on the docket, and Rule 58, prior to the 2002 amendments, required a separate
document for an order disposing of a motion for relief under Rule 60(b).  We reject this
argument and find that the July 22, 1999 order satisfies the separate document
requirement of Rule 58.  See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978); Ahmed v.
       The current version of Rule 58 makes plain that a separate document is not required2
for an order disposing of a motion under Rule 60(b).  See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 58(a)(5).
6
Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 2002).   2
We note also that Rashid appealed the July 22, 1999 order denying his Rule
60(b)(6) motion.  The appeal was treated as a request for a certificate of appealability,
which we denied, see United States v. Rashid, C.A. No. 99-1867, (3d Cir. October 19,
2000).  Rashid has stated in his brief that he did not appeal the order.  See Appellant’s
Brief, at 3.  The record shows, however, that he filed a motion for reconsideration from
the July 22, 1999 order, and argued in a jurisdictional response that the Rule 59(e) motion
was timely filed under Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 1988).  He then filed a
timely notice of appeal from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, giving us
jurisdiction as well over the underlying order denying the Rule 60(b)(6) motion.  See
Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986).
Having found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Rashid’s January of
2009 Rule 59(e) motion on the basis of its untimeliness, the District Court proceeded to
consider the merits of Rashid’s claim in the alternative and found it lacking in merit. 
Rashid contended that the forfeiture was unlawful because the jury was instructed that the
government had met its burden of proof.  Moreover, the official trial transcript was
fraudulently amended to conceal this trial court error.  The District Court obtained the
original recording, listened to it on February 6, 2009, and concluded that the trial judge
       Rashid contended in his brief that, because the District Court is not certified to make3
transcriptions of proceedings not held before the Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 753(b), the
District Court abdicated its role as a neutral arbiter in what should have been a dispute
between Rashid’s expert and another certified court reporter.
7
properly instructed the jury that the government was required to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.  In other words, Rashid was incorrect in his assertion that the trial judge
directed a verdict in the government’s favor by clumsily wording the reasonable doubt
instruction.  Therefore, his claim of a fraud upon the court had no factual basis.  Because
we conclude that the motion for reconsideration was untimely filed, we will not reach this
alternative holding of the District Court’s, or consider Rashid’s arguments that the
District Court erred in its merits determination.3
In the other three motions denied by the District Court, Rashid, acting on
behalf of his adult sons, sought permission for them to intervene and challenge the
forfeiture order.  Rashid contends that the property was titled in trust for Amir and
Anwar, he had no ownership interest in it, and, because his sons were minors at the time,
they could not object to the forfeiture.  We conclude that the District Court properly
resolved this issue.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) governs intervention in civil
proceedings and has no applicability to criminal forfeiture proceedings.  See, e.g., DSI
Associates LLC v. United States, 496 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2007).  Section 853(n) of
title 21, incorporated by the criminal forfeiture provision of 18 U.S.C. § 982, provides the
exclusive means for asserting a legal interest in property which has been ordered forfeited
       To the extent Rashid has argued in his brief that criminal Rule 41(e) provides a basis4
for the return of his former residence, we note that we rejected a similar if not identical
argument in United States v. Rashid, C.A. No. 01-2770 (3d Cir. March 25, 2002), and he
has not provided us with a reason to doubt the correctness of that holding.
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to the United States in a criminal case.  See id.  See also United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d
177, 187 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Congress instead defined two rather limited categories of third
parties who are entitled to petition the courts for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of
their interests in the forfeited property.”).4
As explained by the District Court, section 853(n)(2) requires that a person
asserting a legal interest in property which has been forfeited assert that interest within
thirty (30) days of receiving notice.  If no such petitions are filed within the 30 days, or
following the disposition of any petitions filed by the deadline, the United States “shall
have clear title to property that is the subject of the order of forfeiture....”  21 U.S.C. §
853(n)(7).  Accordingly, even if the time for filing was tolled until Amir and Anwar
reached the age of majority, the January 20, 2009 motions to intervene and to void the
criminal forfeiture were not filed within 30 days of the younger of Rashid’s two sons
having turned 18 years old.  Their petition is thus untimely filed.  Rashid does not dispute
this in his brief on appeal.
Furthermore, we agree with the District Court that all matters concerning
the innocent owner defense and whether Mrs. Rashid and her children were bona fide
purchasers for value, or could demonstrate a vested or superior interest in the property at
9the time of Rashid’s criminal acts, see 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A), (B), were fully and
fairly litigated when Amir and Anwar were minors.  Mrs. Rashid filed her 1994 petition
as trustee for her minor children.  Under Pennsylvania law, a parent may bring an action
on behalf of a minor.  See Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 2027 (“When a party to an action, a minor
shall be represented by a guardian who shall supervise and control the conduct of the
action in behalf of the minor.”).  Cf. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 2228(b) (“If an injury, not resulting
in death, is inflicted upon the person of a minor, and causes of action therefor accrue to
the minor and also to the parent or parents of the minor, they shall be enforced in one
action brought by the parent or parents and the child.  Either parent may sue therefor[e] in
the name of both....”).  We agree with the District Court that there is no evidence that the
interests of Amir and Anwar were not adequately represented by their mother.
Last, the government has asked us in its brief on appeal to enjoin Rashid
from filing any more challenges to his 1993 conviction, absent judicial permission,
pursuant to our power to do so under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.  See also
Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1990).  The government has made a
compelling case that Rashid’s recent spate of motions seeking to reargue decade-old
matters previously decided adverse to him were filed for the purpose of harassment. 
Nevertheless, we will deny this request without prejudice in order to give the newly
assigned district judge the opportunity to address the need for an injunction in the first
instance.
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We will affirm the orders of the District Court dismissing all four of
Rashid’s and his sons’ motions.
